An agent of unknown expertise is requested to forecast the mean of an uncertain outcome. The agent can refine forecasts at a constant marginal cost per unit precision, but neither cost nor precision c be verified by the planner. The problem is to induce both truthful revelation and an appropriate degree of learning so as to minimize the expected sum of direct planning losses and agent payments.
I. Introduction
When outcomes are uncertain, planning must be based on forecastsquite often, on forecasts submitted by others. Naturally, the planner wishes to ensure that these forecasts are prepared honestly and with an appropriate degree of care. But how is this to be done? Even if the outcome departs significantly from what was predicted, one can rarely conclusively infer that the forecaster was intentionally negligent or deceptive. To take extreme examples, a space shuttle explosion or major nuclear reactor accident was deemed very unlikely. Now that these events have occurred, forecasts of the likelihood of similar accidents will presumably be revised upward. This need not mean that previous forecasters were lazy or even that their probability forecasts were necessarily "wrong." On the other hand, it is possible that forecasting incentives were skewed toward careless or overly optimistic reports.
Considering the topic's practical importance, remarkably little has been written about forecasting incentives. What has been written focuses on incentives for honest reporting, without regard for other incentive issues. The agent's utility compensation, often called the "score" in statistical decision theory, is tied to the forecast and to the future observed outcome. The agent is presumed to choose the forecast so as to maximize the expected score. Scoring rules are called "proper" if they always encourage sincere reporting, regardless of the agent's underlying beliefs. Savage (1971) , Thomson (1979 ), Haim (1982 , and Osband and Reichelstein (1985) characterize the full set of' proper scoring rules ("incentive-compatible compensation schemes," in the terminology of principal-agent literature) for specific forecasting measures such as the mean or median. In Osband (1985) , this characterization is extended to arbitrary types of forecasts.
Almost without exception, these articles skirt issues of optimality: the choice of rules within a class. Presumably the planner would be interested in minimizing expected payoff for truthful reports subject to some sort of income or expected income floor for the agent. But this consideration does not by itself lead to a very interesting choice. Scoring rules appear superfluous in this instance for two reasons.
First, the forecaster is assumed to know the outcome distribution without incurring any learning costs, or at least without choosing what those costs will be. Second, the forecaster is assumed unable to influence that distribution by exerting or withholding effort. Relax either of these assumptions and a real trade-off arises between information transfer costs and incentives for effort.
In this article agent learning costs are explicitly incorporated into a forecast elicitation model, while the assumption of agent-independent outcomes is maintained. The forecaster, who is asked to report the mean of an uncertain or random outcome, will begin with a rough estimate. By exerting additional effort, the forecaster can refine this estimate to any desired degree of precision, at a cost varying with his verse selection (the unknown expertise of the forecaster), moral hazard (the unobserved learning effort), and "white noise" (the inherent unpredictability of the outcome). Given the multiple layers of uncertainty, one might suspect that the optimal payoff contract would be very complicated. As it turns out, the best contract, provided forecasters are risk-neutral, is quite simple: quadratic in the reported mean and linear in the outcome, with easily calculated parameters.
When expertise is known, the optimal contract induces a first-best solution: expected total planning cost is no more than it would be with complete and costless monitoring. But when, as is likely, the forecaster's learning expertise is not precisely known, more expert forecasters stand to earn an "information rent." To reduce these rents, the planner tends to sacrifice forecasting precision. The net efficiency loss can be substantial, Section III shows: up to 40 percent of total planning cost, given a uniform prior on expertise.
Section IV investigates the cost-reducing potential of "self-screening" contracts, which induce forecasters to reveal their expertise beforehand. Efficiency gains turn out to be remarkably meager, less than one part in 500 for any uniform expertise distribution. Indeed, for many prior distributions of expertise, self-screening offers no advantages at all. Section V puts the preceding results into a more general principalagent perspective. Forecaster self-screening is reinterpreted, somewhat surprisingly, as a special case of the Laffont-Tirole (1986) model of a regulated firm with ex post observable costs. The reinterpretation helps to account for the stiff second-order conditions. Section VI explores the potential for using competition among forecasters to reduce planning costs. Not only does competition offer significant savings over monopolistic self-screening, but it also considerably simplifies contract implementation. In some cases, contracting is as simple as selecting a single parameter in a quadratic reward schedule and then auctioning off the right to be paid according to this schedule.
II. The Model
Suppose that a planner must rely on some estimate Y of an uncertain outcome (an exchange rate, say) in order to formulate a plan. Should the actual value x deviate from the estimate, an opportunity loss L is incurred proportional to the square of the discrepancy. Thus L (Y, x) c(Y -x)2 for some positive c. If the true distribution of x has mean ,u and variance u 2, expected planning loss is c(Y -11)2 + co-2. It is minimized at Y = pu, leaving only cu 2, the planning loss anticipated from inherent outcome riskiness.
Suppose that the planner does not know p. exactly. Instead she After n -r measurements, the BLUE will have precision n.) The forecaster knows b, which will be called his "expertise" (so that more expert forecasters have lower b). He is risk-neutral and willing to enter any contract offering an expected profit of at least zero.
Let n denote final estimate precision. If the planner could costlessly verify n and b, she would choose n to minimize b(n -r) + (c/n) + cu2, where the first term represents direct forecasting costs. This is achieved at n* = (c/b) 1/2, for total expected planning cost C(n*) of-br + cU 2 + 2(bc)"12. This is the "first-best" solution.
Of the three components of C(n*), the first reflects the costlessness of the first r units of precision, while the second stems from the inherent randomness of x. The remaining component, which will be called the expected administrative cost (EAG), includes both "full" measurement costs (inclusive of r) and the expected loss from having an imperfect estimate of [., with each contributing half. Th rises with measurement cost and the cost of forecast error, but proportionately only half as fast as either.
If only b could be directly verified, the first-best solution could still be obtained as follows. For report Y, consider the payment schedule ("contract") H(Y, x) = -c(Y -x) br + cu2 + 2(bc)"2. (1) Here the forecaster bears the planner's entire loss and receives enough side compensation to achieve the reservation expected utility zero. Writing this contract requires knowledge of u 2, however. Should The simplicity of the contracts above coupled with their satisfaction of properties a-c makes them particularly easy to administer. The planner has only to select an appropriate Q and R in (2). In fact, as we shall see later, a contract of type (2) is optimal in the class of all contracts.
Let the planner's beliefs about b be described by a cumulative distribution function G(), so that G(bo) denotes the subjective probability that b does not exceed bo, and let 13 be the perceived upper bound to b.
If the planner is committed to hiring the forecaster regardless of type, she should adjust (2) until a type 13 forecaster would be indifferent between working and not working. This implies an entrance fee of R = Pr + Q(y2 +I -2(P3Q)1/2 (3)
for any chosen Q, by analogy with (1').
Since (1) has no general closed-form solution.
When (6) applies, expected cost A* = (f(Q*) equals 261/281/2a -Pr + cu2. (7) At the optimum, forecasting error ciQ* -1/2 accounts for ha (the first term in [7] ), the same proportion as under certainty. For r small, the remainder is split between expected "full" measurement costs fbn(b)dG(b) and forecasting rents in ratio 8:2(131/2 -8).
III. Costs of Agency
The costs of agency under uncertainty-or, perhaps I should say instead, the costs of uncertainty under agency-are measured by the value A. Consider as a benchmark the optimal allocation when b is randomly distributed according to G(-) but costlessly verified prior to contracting. The EAC in (7) is A times as high as in the benchmark, while for every value of b, final estimate precision is a fraction 1/A of its value in the benchmark.
The lower 8 is relative to its upper bound, the greater the relative advantages of full information. By Jensen's inequality, the expectation of a square root is less than or equal to the square root of the The planner strives to minimize the sum of expected forecasting loss and expected gross payoff to the forecaster, or
where g(Q) is the density of G() on support [(x, 13] The solution to (13) where EG denotes the elasticity of G() with respect to b. This is less than the first-best solution by a ratio [1 + ('/EG)]-1/2. Precision is sacrificed to reduce the "information rents" accruing to all but the worst forecasters. Prior beliefs about expertise exert their influence through the ratio G(b)/g(b), which closely resembles the inverse hazard rate appearing in the solution to most adverse selection problems (Maskin and Riley 1984) . Indeed, had we defined the cumulative distribution as the probability-currently 1 -G(b)-of an expert worse than b, as is customary for adverse selection problems, then the inverse hazard rate would have appeared.
In the standard terminology of the literature, b[1 + (1/E(;)] is the forecaster's "virtual" type; that is, as part of the trade-off for truthful revelation, the planner agrees to act as if the forecaster were of the virtual rather than the true type. To say this another way, the game of hiring forecasters under uncertainty is equivalent to the game of hiring their virtual type counterparts under certainty.
The preceding derivation is misleading in one important respect.
We have looked only at the first-order condition for truthful revelation of b when a second-order condition must be met too. The condition is 2bn'(b) + n(b) ' 0, which together with (13) requires dEG 0. (14) db (14 In other words, the proportional gap between the virtual type and the true type must rise with b or stay constant. If not, (13) will not define the optimum policy. There will be partial or complete pooling of types; that is, the optimal contract will be identical along some interval of expertise. A more detailed discussion, including instructions for calculating the constrained optimum, is found in Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) . It can also be shown, either by checking directly for stationary points or through applying Guesnerie and Laffont's more general methods, that satisfaction of (14) guarantees the optimality of the contract defined by (8), (10), and (13).
To get some intuition for (14), consider that the n(-) of (13) ' Communication has a slightly larger though still small impact on forecast p and the distribution of expected rents across agents. With a uniform distribution of expertise, separation of contracts according to expertise induces the most skilled forecasters to take more measurements than they would otherwise and less skilled forecasters to take fewer measurements than they would otherwise, with overall estimate precision slightly higher on average. With (x = 0.31, e.g., final estimate precision is 23 percent higher for the most skilled agent. It falls, rapidly at first but at a decreasing rate, to 11 percent for an expertise of 0.4, 4 percent for an expertise of 0.5, and eventually to -6 percent for the least skilled agent, for an average precision gain of 3 percent. Notwithstanding the more thoroughgoing investigation, expert forecasters expect less rent-up to 2.7 percent less with a = 0.31 and r small-with self-screening contracts; on the other hand, rents are higher for the worst agents than they would be otherwise-up to 8.8 percent higher for (x = 0.31 and r small (the limiting value, [2/(2 -a)], is found using L'H6pital's rule). Because of the extra measurement cost for more precise estimates, the EAC ratio with and without self-screening is not monotonic in expertise: for ax = 0.31 the savings start at 0.2 percent for the most expert agent, increase to 1.1 percent at an expertise of 0.45, and fall to -1.4 percent for an expertise of 1. where the last equality follows by reversing the order of integration.
Equation (18) (14) and (19) together imply b'(%) > 0, so the latter condition may be dropped as redundant. In economic terms, the inability to peg rewards to forecasting precision forces a stronger second-order condition on the" model than would otherwise apply.
From here it is easy to verify that the contract described in (8), (9), and (15) is optimal. Note that this is optimality in the class of all contracts, not just optimality in the class of equation (2) 
VI. Competition between Forecasters
While theoretically intriguing, the results of the previous two sections are disappointing from a practical standpoint. Self-screening is much less valuable than one might have hoped. This section pursues a different tack to reducing planning costs: using competition among forecasters. Competition improves efficiency both directly, by enabling the manager to hire the best available agent, and indirectly, by reducing the expected rents paid a given forecaster. As we shall see, both the direct and indirect savings can be substantial.
Let G(b) continue to denote the probability that a randomly chosen agent will have expertise b or better. Instead of facing a single applicant, however, the planner will now be allowed to choose one applicant from a pool. Two polar cases will be considered: one in which the forecaster pool is assembled prior to contracting and cannot be expanded later, and another in which the forecaster pool is infinitely expandable at cost A per forecaster. Appendix B addresses the possibility of splitting up investigations among forecasters.
As Laffont and Tirole (1987) Since EK equals EG, we see from (15) As the number of competitors increases, expected second-best expertise is driven closer to first-best expertise, raising the relative efficiency of an auction. Thus with six participants an auction captures about two-thirds of the difference between no screening and full screening, whereas self-screening captures about a quarter.
Additional insights into the value of competition can be gleaned from examination of auctions with flexible pool size. Suppose that the planner can decide sequentially whether to elicit another bid, at constant search cost A per forecaster. In this case the manager should hire the first agent revealing a b below some predetermined threshold B. The optimal screening rule takes this form because of the "memoryless" nature of the process: previously incurred costs and revealed expertise levels have no effect on future agents' screening costs and likely expertise levels.
The first agent appearing with b ? B will accept H*(-) and the search will end. Again, since EK equals EG, final estimate precision is n*(b) in (13) independent of B. The expected number of agents screened, T(B), equals one times the probability G(B) that the first agent is taken plus 1 + T(B) times the probability that the first agent is not taken. Thus T(B) = 1/G(B). For EG = 1, the optimum B can be shown to satisfy [c1(?1;1/2)2 -PB r 0, (24) so that for r small,
The lower the marginal search cost and the higher the cost of estimate imprecision, the lower the threshold should be set, which means that the manager will tend to screen more agents. The elasticities of the threshold with respect to A or 1/c are equal and less than one-half.
The threshold rises with A, but B/e falls, so that as the support of G widens, more agents tend to be screened.
The absolute savings from access to competition vary with A and other parameters in a predictable manner and will not be examined further here. We shall focus instead on the expected relative shares of search costs, direct measurement costs, estimate imprecision losses, and information rents. Surprisingly, these shares are independent of hierarchies, performance would probably be improved by giving forecasters a chance to profit from accurate estimates. The drawback is that rents are likely to be substantial. In government, especially, where incentives for economizing are weak, suspicions of waste or corruption would be raised. Distinguishing "honest" from "dishonest"
rents could indeed be difficult.
The analysis also suggests that organizations that operate on a "need-to-know" principle, so that forecasting expertise is restricted to one or a handful of individuals, do so at a cost of reduced planning efficiency. Perhaps this is a factor in the disappointing efficiency record of Soviet central planning. Carrying "redundant" forecasting expertise would seem to be wasteful. Yet redundancy can make for more vigorous competition, which improves selection and squeezes forecasting rents. At the very least, the notion that planning obviates inefficient competitive information gathering must be supplemented with its opposite: that competition in information gathering helps to remedy inefficient planning. shown that all contracts satisfying condition a must take the form
For an economic interpretation of (Al), see Osband (1985) . In general, incentives for investigation will vary with the convexity of V( ). Suppose that the agent thinks that the mean is either Y + w or Y -w with equal probability and that an investigation costing b could determine the mean exactly. More generally, let the postinvestigation estimate correction W have distribution Jy(-). For example, if the current unbiased estimate has precision n and the forecasting technology involves taking an additional conditionally independent measurement of precision e at cost be, Jy(-) will have precision (n/e)(n + e), or n2/e in the limit (Zellner [1971] Condition c says that satisfaction of (A2) should depend only on be and n2/e. We claim that this implies that V(-) is quadratic. To do so we make use of the following lemma, proved in Osband and Reichelstein (1985) . The treatment of competition in the text assumes that the planner ultimately hires only one forecaster. Hiring one forecaster is always best provided "startup" costs for forecasters are sufficiently high. Even without start-up costs, however, hiring one forecaster may be optimal.
Consider the following forecasting technology: starting from the unbiased estimate Yo of , having precision r, take successive independent "measurements" of p,, each having precision one and costing b, and calculate the best linear unbiased estimator (the precision-weighted average of the measurements and prior). Then if measurements are independent across forecasters, one person's forecast cannot be used to flush information out of another. In the constant Q, R contracts described in equations (2)- (6) subject to n? > r and In, = N. Set up a Hamiltonian for (B 1) with multipliers Xj on the n -? r constraints. First-order conditions are readily seen to require Xj to be positive for all but the lowest by; that is, only the most expert forecaster should be induced to do any additional investigation.
It remains an open question whether splitting investigations might be superior when measurements are correlated across forecasters: say, that measurement 1, if taken, would be the same for all forecasters, that measurement 2 would be the same for all forecasters, and so on.
